Abstract The paper investigates, in the framework of branching space-times, whether an infinite EPR-like correlation which does not involve finite EPR-like correlations is possible.
In subsequent investigations of EPR-like correlations (and of Bell's theorem), set-ups with more measurement stations were considered. Accordingly, in our usage, the size of a correlation (and hence the finite vs. infinite distinction) refers to the number of measurement stations.
We focus on what we take to be essential aspects of EPR-like correlations: their spatiotemporal and modal features. As for the former, we assume that the experiment occurs in Minkowski space-time. The modal aspect is seen in the popular diagnosis of EPR, which says that although every outcome of a single measurement is possible, certain combinations of outcomes (or, equivalently, a joint outcome) are (is) impossible. To illustrate, in Bohm (1951) version of EPR, + as well as − are possible outcomes of spin measurement, as performed on one particle, while the outcome ++, that is + on both the particles, is impossible. A final word of warning: we neglect the probabilistic aspect of EPR-like correlations, and we do it for two reasons. First, we focus on perfect correlations and anti-correlations, and we read extreme probabilities as 'it must happen/it cannot happen'. Second, we believe that in EPR correlations the modal aspect has a conceptual priority over the probabilistic one.
Given the above assumptions, the essence of EPR-like correlations is as follows: in Minkowski space-time, there is a number (finite or infinite) of measurement events, every two of which are space-like separated. For each measurement event there is a set of possible 'single' outcomes. Yet, certain combinations of single outcomes are impossible.
EPR-like correlations, as described above, can be rigorously investigated in (a non-probabilistic version of) branching space-times (BST), a theory proposed by Belnap (1992) . 1 The BST framework rigorously combines modality and (rudiments of) special relativity. It has been used to diagnose Bell's theorem. 2 In this theory, a feature analogous to pre-probabilistic EPR-like correlation is called 'modal funny business', which is defined so as to capture the idea that a certain combination of otherwise possible outcomes of space-like separated measurement events is impossible. The investigation of this notion brought Müller (2005) to ask whether infinite modal funny business not involving finite modal funny business is possible. It is this question that sparked our interest in the issues discussed here. In a sense, the question was answered in the positive by Müller et al. (2006) . They produced a set-theoretical structure (called M 2 and described here in Sect. 3) which satisfies all the axioms of BST and exhibits infinite modal funny business without there being finite modal funny business. Yet the structure has no relation to any space-time, including Minkowski space-time. Thus, the intriguing question remains: in Minkowski space-time can there be a case of infinite modal funny business which does not involve finite modal funny business?
This state of affairs brings in our two tasks. First, we single out two conditions such that each yields infinite funny business in an arbitrary BST model, and such that if none holds in a BST model, the model is free of infinite funny business.
Second, we focus on a special class of BST models, which we think are more 'physically realistic', since in these models histories are isomorphic to Minkowski space-time. The models are called Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS's). We show that in an MBS, if there is infinite funny business, a set in 4 which generates it must be very strangely located. We also show that the truth of the first condition (A) requires a converging sequence of measurement events. We finally exhibit an MBS model in which the other condition (B) is true, yet the model has an odd feature, which (we conjecture) is necessary for the truth of the condition. Thus, our findings strongly speak against the possibility of infinite funny business in physically motivated models of BST.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we review some definitions and facts of BST which we need later. Section 3 provides definitions of modal funny business for general BST, introduces two conditions, and relates the occurrence/non-occurrence of infinite funny business in BST to the satisfaction (or not) of those conditions. Section 4 links the above results to Minkowskian Branching Structures: it asks what the conditions presuppose of MBS's, and hence, at what price one can have in Minkowski space-time an infinite EPR-like correlation which does not involve finite correlations. The final Sect. 5 states our conclusions and poses some open problems. Belnap's (1992) theory of BST combines objective indeterminism and relativity in a rigorous way. Its primitives are a nonempty set W (called 'Our World', interpreted as the set of all possible point events) and a partial ordering on W , interpreted as a 'causal order' between point events.
Branching space-times
There are no 'possible worlds' in this theory; there is only one world, Our World, containing all that is (timelessly) possible. Instead, a notion of 'history' is used, as defined below:
Definition 1 A set h ⊆ W is upward-directed iff ∀e 1 , e 2 ∈ h ∃e ∈ h such that e 1 e and e 2 e. A set h is maximal with respect to the above property iff ∀g ⊆ W such that g h, g is not upward-directed. A subset h of W is a history iff it is a maximal upward-directed set. H ist is the set of all histories in the model. H (e) is the set of all histories to which point event e belongs. For histories h 1 and h 2 , any maximal element in h 1 ∩ h 2 is called a choice point for h 1 and h 2 . For e 1 , e 2 ∈ W , e 1 and e 2 are space-like related (e 1 SLR e 2 ) iff ∃h ∈ H ist : e 1 , e 2 ∈ h and e 1 e 2 and e 2 e 1 . For E 1 , E 2 ⊆ W , E 1 SLR E 2 iff ∀e 1 ∈ E 1 ∀e 2 ∈ E 2 : e 1 SLR e 2 . We say that A ⊆ W is consistent if A is a subset of a history; otherwise we say it is inconsistent.
A very important feature of BST is that histories are closed downward: if e 1 e 2 and e 1 / ∈ h, then e 2 / ∈ h. In other words, there is no backward branching among histories in BST.
We will now give the definition of a BST model; for more information about BST in general see Belnap (1992) .
Definition 2 W,
where W is a nonempty set and is a partial ordering on W is a model of BST if and only if it meets the following requirements:
1. The ordering is dense. 2.
has no maximal elements. 3. Every lower bounded chain in W has an infimum in W . 4. Every upper bounded chain in W has a supremum in every history that contains it. 5. (The prior choice principle ('PCP')) For any lower bounded chain O ⊆ h 1 /h 2 there exists a point e ∈ W such that e is maximal in h 1 ∩h 2 and ∀e ∈ O : e < e .
The strict ordering <, as used in the statement of the PCP, is defined as usual, namely
Note that BST has events, yet in general it has neither space-time points, nor a space-time (i.e., a collection of space-time points). The intuition behind spacetime points is that we want to be able to say that something happens 'in the same space-time point' in different histories. Following Müller (2005) , we say that a triple W, , s is a 'BST model with space-time points' (BST + S) iff W, is a BST model and s (from the expression 'space-time point') is an equivalence relation on W such that (1) for each history h in W and for each equivalence class s(x), x ∈ W , the intersection h ∩ s(x) contains exactly one element and (2) s respects the ordering: for equivalence classes s(x), s(y) and histories h 1 , h 2 , s(x) ∩ h 1 = s(y) ∩ h 1 iff s(x) ∩ h 2 = s(y) ∩ h 2 , and the same for '<' and '>'. As Müller shows, not every BST model can be extended to a BST + S model. Moreover, there are BST + S models in which S (the set of space-time points) has nothing in common with any physical space-time-take M 2 of Sect. 3.1 as an example.
Following Müller (2002) , in our paper (2007) we introduced a special kind of BST models: the Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS's for short), in which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski space-time. To describe them in full detail would require radically expanding this already overgrown paper; let it just be said that the points of MBS models are of the shape [x σ ], where x is a point from 4 and σ belongs to , a set of history labels. For detailed information, see the above papers; for the very essence, see Appendix "MBS Model" below.
Funny business
Funny business in BST is to resemble EPR correlations. The underlying idea is that there are two space-like related events whose outcomes are correlated in the sense that a combinatorially possible history is missing. As an example, consider a BST model of the EPR-Bohm experiment (Bohm 1951) . There are two space-like related measurement events e 1 and e 2 , idealized to be point-like. Each has two outcomes, 'spin up' and 'spin down', represented by sets of histories, resp. H 1 +, H 1 − and H 2 +, H 2 −. For example, H 1 + is the set of histories in which result 'spin up' at measurement event e 1 occurs. 3 Since histories with results 'spin up' at e 1 and 'spin down' at e 2 (or vice versa) are possible, the intersections H 1 + ∩ H 2 − and H 1 − ∩ H 2 + are nonempty. Yet we have H 1 + ∩ H 2 + = H 1 − ∩ H 2 − = ∅, since no history with equal spin projections is possible.
Taking a clue from this example, funny business requires two space-like related (SLR) point events e 1 , e 2 such that for some outcomes H 1 of e 1 and H 2 of e 2 : H 1 ∩H 2 = ∅. Since e 1 and e 2 are SLR, the two share a history. Now, this basic idea could be generalized in two directions, giving rise to the notions of finitary funny business and infinitary funny business. As for the former, following Belnap (2002) we allow for extended (i.e., not point-like) events, say A and B, require that they be SLR in the sense that ∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ B (x SLR y), and we do not demand the sum of the two events to be consistent. 4 The result is Belnap's notion of generalized-primary space-like-related modal-correlation-funny business.
To obtain the infinitary version of funny business, consider a set S of (not necessarily SLR) infinitely many point events and require that any two elements of S be consistent in the sense that every outcome of the first event intersects non-emptily with every outcome of the other. The funny business consists in there being an infinite set of outcomes of events of S, one outcome for each element of S, the intersection of which is empty (we later show that the difference between the two types of funny business lies not only in cardinality). The resulting notion, which is closely related to the combinatorial funny business of Müller et al. (2006) , gives rise to a more familiar concept if one further requires that S be consistent and pairwise SLR.
Replacing the informal notion of an event's outcome, we have a concept of 'elementary possibility at e', defined as an element of a certain partition of H (e) , i.e., of the set of histories passing through e. The partition is via an equivalence relation ≡ e on H (e) which is to convey the sense of 'being undivided in e'-sharing a point above e.
Definition 3 Consider h 1 , h 2 ∈ H (e) . h 1 ≡ e h 2 iff ∃e * > e such that e * ∈ h 1 ∩ h 2 . h 1 ⊥ e h 2 iff h 1 , h 2 ∈ H (e) and it is not the case that h 1 ≡ e h 2 . Suppose H ⊆ H (e) . Then,
The relation ≡ e is an equivalence relation on H (e) due to BST postulates, as shown in Belnap (1992) , Facts 45-46. This relation serves to define the notion of elementary possibility.
Definition 4 If h ∈ H (e)
, we say that e h ⊆ H (e) is an elementary possibility (open) at e iff it is the equivalence class of the history h w.r.t. the relation ≡ e . If x ∈ W and e < x, by e x we mean the elementary possibility at e to which some history h ∈ H (x) belongs.
Following the existing literature we define e as the set of all elementary possibilities at e.
Next, for a given set S we will consider functions f which, given a point e ∈ S as an argument, produce an elementary possibility from e . Colloquially speaking, function f resembles a pointer, indicating for every e ∈ S which elementary possibility at e is selected. Formally, a pointer function is an element of the set e∈S e of functions, defined as follows:
The definitions of finitary and infinitary funny business run as follows:
S, f is a case of finitary funny business iff there exist two sets
S, f is a case of infinitary funny business iff (1) card(S) ω and (2) ∀A (A ⊆ f in S → ∃h ∈ H ist A ⊆ h) and (3) ∀e, e ∈ S (e < e → f (e ) ⊆ f (e)) and (4) {f (e) : e ∈ S} = ∅. S gives rise to (in)finitary funny business iff there exists f ∈ e∈S e such that S, f is a case of (in)finitary funny business.
As for finitary funny business, our notion is equivalent to Belnap's generalized primary SLR modal-correlation funny business (for details, see Appendix "Equivalences"). To see the rationale underlying clause (3) of the definition of infinitary funny business, note that due to that clause there is no infinitary funny business if for some e, e ∈ S (e < e ∧ f (e ) ⊆ f (e)), which entails, by properties of elementary possibilities, that (*) f (e ) ∩ f (e) = ∅. In other words, the reason why infinite intersection {f (e) : e ∈ S} is empty is that intersection (*) is empty. In a similar vein, by clause (2), we do not call it infinitary funny business if some finite subset of S is inconsistent: in this case there is nothing funny in {f (e) : e ∈ S} = ∅, as this follows from the above.
The relation to Müller et al. (2006) 's notion of combinatorial funny business is this: If S, f is a case of infinitary funny business, then S, f constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business. In the other direction, if S, f constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business but S, f is not a case of finitary funny business, then S, f is a case of infinitary funny business. For details, see Appendix "Equivalences".
One might find the above definitions not completely intuitive or even objectionable, and to some extent we share this feeling. For instance, in what follows, while discussing finitary and infinitary funny business, we are concerned with only such S that are consistent and pairwise SLR. So, the definitions given above are too general for our purposes. Despite these disadvantages, we assume them since they are closely related to the extant definitions, and there are some odd structures arising from an S that is neither pairwise SLR nor consistent. For brevity, from now on instead of 'finitary funny business' we will usually write 'FINFB' and instead of 'infinitary funny business' we will usually write 'INFFB'. We will also say that NO FINFB (NO INFFB) is true in a BST model W = W, meaning that no S ⊆ W gives rise to FINFB (INFFB).
M 2
Müller et al. (2006) introduced a certain BST structure named M 2 , in which FINFB was absent, whereas INFFB was present. We will now briefly reproduce their definition, because we will use this structure in our theorems. For a detailed discussion and a proof that M 2 is a BST model with the above properties, see the mentioned paper. M 2 is a pair W, . W is a union of four sets:
and W 3 = [2, ∞) × F where F is the set of all functions g: N → {0, 1} such that for only finitely many n ∈ N, g(n) = 0. See Fig. 1 .
The strict partial ordering < is the transitive closure of the following four relations:
• For e, e 1 from the same W i : e < e 1 iff the first coordinate of e is smaller than that of e 1 and the other coordinates are the same.
The non-strict companion of < is defined as usual: e e iff e < e or e = e . The structure M 2 has a countable set H ist of histories and also a countable set of binary choice points S = { 1, n : n ∈ N}. Moreover, there is one-to-one correspondence between H ist and F, which allows us to identify values of pointer functions (i.e., elementary possibilities) with certain subsets of F. At each point e = 1, n there are two elementary possibilities, both of the form {g ∈ F | g(n) = b}, where b is 0 or 1. that z(x) = 0 for every x ∈ N. On the other hand, there is no case of FINFB in M 2 (see Müller et al. 2006 ). Thus, M 2 is just a case in point: it has INFFB that does not involve any case of FINFB. In due time, we will ask if the structure can be 'converted' into an MBS. At this stage, let us note some 'strange' features of M 2 . First, in M 2 a point above some two choice points is always above an infinite number of choice points. Second, in M 2 one can define a set of nested consistent subsets of base set W , whose union is inconsistent. The existence of such an odd set is the essence of our Condition B (to be introduced later).
Results
One might expect that there are cases of INFFB that involve FINFB: indeed, the theorem below justifies this intuition and gives it a precise reading. 
and f = f |A∪B , and continue the argument from ( †) below. If A ∪ B is finite, define now S := {x ∈ h S | ¬∃e 1 ∈ A, e 2 ∈ B (x > e 1 ∧ x > e 2 )}. Let us first argue that S is infinite. Pick a, a maximal element of A and b, a maximal element of B (they exist since A ∪ B is finite); since both share h S , there is a y such that y > a ∧ y > b. Consider next a dense chain l a from y to a, such that inf (l a ) = a. (The move is licensed by the density requirement, cf. Definition 2.1.) If (7) ∀x (x > a → x > b), then l a is lower bounded by b. Yet since a is the infimum, i.e., the greatest lower bound of l a , it must be that a b, which contradicts (1). Hence, since (7) cannot be true, there is an x such that x < y and x > a but x > b. Density of l a implies that Z := {z ∈ l a | z < x} is infinite; since Z ⊆ S , S is infinite as well.
As for the next condition of INFFB, since S ⊆ h S , it must be that ∀A ⊆ f in S A ⊆ h S .
We define f ∈ e∈S e :
e h A if e ∈ A ∪ B and ∃x ∈ A(e < x) e h B if e ∈ A ∪ B and ∃x ∈ B(e < x) e h S otherwise ( †) By the definitions of S and f and (1)-(6) we have: ∀e, e ∈ S (e < e → f (e ) ⊆ f (e)). By (4), since A ∪ B ⊆ S , we get {f (e) : e ∈ S } = ∅.
Our title question, however, is just the opposite: are there cases of INFFB that do not involve FINFB? Before we turn to our main theorems, let us first show some simpler facts:
Fact 7 Suppose that S is finite and pairwise SLR. Then, if S does not give rise to FINFB,
The fact stems from the fact that any finite set is a union of a finite family of singletons. e ∈ S} = ∅. We can, of course, think of the function g defined on S as a union of two functions defined respectively on A 1 and A 2 . Thus, we see that S, g constitute a case of FINFB because {g(e) : e ∈ A i } = ∅ and {g(e) : e ∈ A 2 } = ∅ while {g(e) : e ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 } = ∅. Therefore S gives rise to FINFB.
The above theorem yields the following simple corollary:
Corollary 9 Assume S is an infinite consistent set of pairwise SLR points. Then, if S does not give rise to FINFB and there exists a cofinite subset of S which does not give rise to INFFB, then the whole set S does not give rise to INFFB.
Turning to our main theorems characterizing INFFB, we will now introduce two conditions, prove a few theorems, and show how they relate to FINFB and INFFB.
Condition 10 (Condition A) There exist (1) a set S ⊆ W that is an infinite consistent set of pairwise SLR points and (2) a function f ∈ e∈S e such that ∃e ∈ S ∀h ∈ H ist ∀x ∈ W :
The motivation for this condition comes from a certain structure, called M 1 , that Müller et al. (2006) introduced. In this structure, one tries 'by hand' to prohibit the existence of a certain history, by this means producing a case of INFFB, without there being a case of FINFB. This procedure, however, fails if Condition A is false. In this case, a seemingly excluded history gets re-inserted 'by force' by the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma. Namely, the falsity of Condition A ensures the existence of a certain function that can be used to produce a chain of events which extends, by the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma, to the seemingly excluded history. More precisely, if Condition A is false, then for any infinite pairwise SLR and consistent set S and for any function f ∈ e∈S e we can define a function F : S → H ist × W in the following way (e ∈ S):
(Of course many different functions meeting this requirement might exist, as there might be many equally good candidates for h and x such that for a given e : F (e) = h, x . What is important for us is that, when Condition A is false, such functions do exist; we will just choose one.) Thus, we assume Condition A in order that the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma not produce histories, which we seemingly excluded. Consider a structure resembling M 1 (see Fig. 2 ). It satisfies NO FINFB, the master set is 2 and there is a denumerable set C := {(0, n)|n ∈ N} of binary choice points (label the elementary possibilities "0" and "1"). Put c i := (0, i). Speaking informally, suppose we try to enforce INFFB by demanding that there is no history belonging to the intersection of "0"-possibilities. In other words, we require that for pointer function f defined on C and yielding "0"-possibility at every c i ∈ C, C, f is a case of INFFB. Suppose, though, that Condition A is false. Therefore there exists a function F as described in Eq. 2. Using this function we will construct a certain chain, which by the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma will have to belong to a history from the intersection of "0"-possibilities at c i for all i ∈ N, showing that we did not succeed in "forcing" INFFB. Namely: F (c 0 ) := h 0 , l 0 . We know that the point l 0 is above c 0 and belongs to a history h 0 from the "0"-possibility at c 0 . Suppose F (c 1 ) := h 1 , l 1 . We know that the point l 1 is above c 1 and belongs to a history h 1 from the "0"-possibility at c 1 . Therefore, by NO FINFB, there is a history h 1 from the intersection of "0"-possibilities at c 0 and c 1 such that l 0 , l 1 ∈ h 1 . Let l 1 belong to h 1 and l 0 l 1 , l 1 l 1 (we can find such a point since histories are upward-directed). Continue with F (c 2 ) to obtain l 2 such that l 0 l 1 l 2 and so on for higher n ∈ N.
In sum: due to NO FINFB and falsity of Condition A we can construct a denumerable chain L = l 0 , l 1 , l 2 . . . such that l i is above all of {c 0 . . . c i } and is in a history from the intersection of "0"-possibilities at each of those points. Since (by the KuratowskiZorn lemma) every chain is a subset of some history, there is a history h:L ⊆ h. Evidently h belongs to the intersection of "0"-possibilities at c i for all i ∈ N, and so the set S, f does not yield INFFB after all.
As for the second condition, it relates to structure M 2 and the question why it contains a case of INFFB (see Fig. 1 ). In M 2 one can define a set of nested consistent subsets of the base set W , whose union is inconsistent. Namely,
Clearly, elements of are nested, that is ∀ m<n m ⊆ n . Moreover, each n is consistent since there is in F a function that yields 0 for any m n. Yet, is inconsistent, as in F there is no function that yields 0 for every natural number. Our tentative diagnosis is this peculiarity is responsible for INFFB. Hence this condition 5 :
There is a set of nested consistent subsets of W such that is inconsistent. 6 The theorems we will show are summarized in the list below: Proof Since by the assumption S is infinite, pairwise SLR, and for some history h : S ⊆ h, we have: (1) card (S) ω and (2) ∀A (A ⊆ f in S → ∃h ∈ H ist : A ⊆ h), and (3) ∀e, e ∈ S (e < e → f (e ) ⊆ f (e)). We thus need to show (4) {f (e)|e ∈ S} = ∅. For reductio assume {f (e)|e ∈ S} = ∅. Hence, there must be a history (a) h * ∈ {f (e)|e ∈ S}. Suppose e * ∈ S is one of the points of which the existential formula of Condition A is true. Since it follows that h * ∈ f (e * ), it is true for e * that
Again, since h * ∈ f (e * ) and there are no maximal elements in the model (see BST postulate 2 of Definition 2), we can find a point x * such that x * > e * and x * ∈ h * . In other words, for this x * two disjuncts of the above alternative are false-so the third one must be true. But it also is false, since one of the conjuncts is always false: namely, because of (a) it can't be true for any e 1 ∈ S that h * / ∈ f (e 1 ). So the whole alternative is false for x * , and thus we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore {f (e)|e ∈ S} = ∅ so S, f constitute a case of INFFB.
We will now establish that INFFB follows from Condition B together with NO FINFB. Suppose that Condition B is true due to a certain set of nested consistent subsets of W . Our goal is to find a set S and a function f such that S, f is a case of INFFB. Proof Let be a set of nested consistent subsets of W of which Condition B is true. Define for every A ∈ :
Theorem 13 Suppose that in a BST
where
We tentatively define the pointer function f on S:
Since A is consistent, f (e) = ∅. 
If e, e ∈ C(A), then by the definition of f : f (e) = f (e ) and (r2) (r1)). Yet, the following three conditions hold: (r9) e < e by (r2), (r10) e ∈ h by (r8), and (r11) ∀h ∈ H [B] : e ∈ h , since by (r3) and (6): for every h ∈ H [B] e ∈ h and e < e by (r2). And (r9)-(r11) imply that ∀h ∈ H [B] : h ≡ e h . Thus, we have h ∈ e B , and hence by (r4):
Next, we prove the following:
For indirect proof, let us assume that there is a history h and an event x ∈ W such that (r13) ∀e ∈ S : h ∈ f (e) and x ∈ / h, x ∈ A ⊆ for some A. For some history h x ∈ H (x) , we thus have x ∈ h x /h. By the Prior Choice Principle, for some
Hence, by (5) and (6), c ∈ C(A) ⊆ S, so by (r13) and (r1): h ∈ c A , i.e., h ≡ c H [A] . Contradiction with (r14). Now, Condition B says that is inconsistent, so (r12) implies that
We next prove that
Assume that S is inconsistent, which means that
But clearly, for some h ∈ H (x) , x ∈ h . Hence, by (r17):
By the PCP:
and hence:
(r18) implies that x ∈ C(A) and thus, for some h ∈ H ist : h ⊥ x H [A] , from which we get:
Thus, by (r18) and (r19):
Pick now some B ∈ . From (r20):
Yet, since is a set of nested consistent intervals, there must be a history, call it h * , such that A ∪ B ⊆ h * . Put now h * in (r21) to obtain:
, which is absurd, since h * ∈ H [A] . We next prove that
Consider the set X * of historical suprema in some history h S : S ⊂ h S of maximal chains in X. As X is finite, X * is a subset of S, so, by (r16), it is consistent. Its elements are pairwise SLR. Hence, since we assumed that no subset of W gives rise to FINFB, it follows by Corollary (7) that (r23) {f (e) | e ∈ X * } = ∅.
By the construction, if e ∈ X/X * , then there is an e ∈ X * such that e < e . By (r2) then, f (e ) ⊆ f (e). This and (r23) entails that {f (e) | e ∈ X} = ∅. Implication (r22) entails that
Otherwise, by (r12) and (r22) there would be a history h such that ⊆ h, which contradicts Condition B.
To see that S, f is a case of INFFB, we need to show that (1) card(S) ω and (2) every finite subset of S is consistent and (3) ∀e, e ∈ S (e < e → f (e ) ⊆ f (e)) and (4) {f (e) : e ∈ S} = ∅. Yet, we have already established these conditions: (1) is (r24), (2) is an immediate consequence of (r16), (3) is (r2) and (4) is (r15).
Note that S, as constructed in the proof above, gives rise to INFFB but it does not need to be pairwise SLR. We might try to improve on this predicament by redefining S by putting:
where h * is a history such that S ⊆ h * (such a history exists by (r16)). Clearly, S * , if it exists, is pairwise SLR. We can then prove that, if S * exists, it gives rise to INFFB. Yet, there is no guarantee that S does not contain chains without an upper bound. Thus, to secure a more familiar INFFB, that is, yielded by a consistent and pairwise SLR set, we need a yet another requirement, called a Supplement, which refers to S from the proof above:
Supplement Every chain in S is upper bounded, where S is defined as in (6). Proof Suppose that S is infinite, pairwise SLR and consistent. Since S, f not being a case of INFFB is equivalent to the disjunction of four conditions, it suffices to show that one of these conditions obtains. That is, we will prove that for any pointer function f on S, {f (e) : e ∈ S} = ∅.
Consider a pointer function f on S. Since Condition A is false, there is a function
Base step. Pick an element of S and dub it e 0 . For some x 0 ∈ W and h 0 ∈ H ist we have that F (e 0 ) = h 0 , x 0 . Consider (b0) S 0 := {e ∈ S : h 0 ∈ f (e) ∧ e < x 0 }. If S 0 = S, we have completed the proof and h 0 is the desired history, since then ∀e ∈ S (h 0 ∈ f (e)). Otherwise, we have to continue by considering another subset S 1 of S, as seen below. Since it might happen that S ⊆ h 0 , we introduce another history, taking advantage of NO FINFB and of S being consistent and pairwise SLR: (b1) h 0 ∈ ∩{ e h 0 | e ∈ S 0 } ∩ {h | (S/S 0 ⊆ h}. 7 Finally, we put (b2) x 0 := s(x 0 ) ∩ h 0 and 0 = {x 0 }.
Next step, didactic. To ease the exposition of the successor step and the limit step, consider how to proceed after the base step. Observe first that for every e ∈ S/S 0 : e SLR 0 . For, if h 0 ∈ f (e), then by the definition of function F : (d0) e SLR x 0 . By (b2), since s conserves the ordering, e and x 0 are incomparable. On the other hand, if (d1) h 0 ∈ f (e), then e and x 0 must be incomparable: x 0 e entails e 0 < e, which is impossible, since S is pairwise SLR; e < x 0 entails (by (b0) and (d1)) that e ∈ S 0 , which contradicts e ∈ S/S 0 . It follows by (b2) (since s conserves the ordering) that x 0 and e are incomparable. As by (b1) and (b2): e, x 0 ∈ h 0 , we have (d2) 0 SLR S/S 0 .
We pick now some element of S/S 0 and dub it e 1 . For some h 1 and x 1 : F (e 1 ) = h 1 , x 1 . We put S 1 := {e ∈ S/S 0 : h 1 ∈ f (e) ∧ e < x 1 }. Given (d2) and NO FINFB, since each of the three sets in the intersection below is non-empty, there is history h 1 such that
Define x 1 := s(x 1 ) ∩ h 1 and 1 = 0 ∪ {x 1 }. By this definition and (d3): 1 ⊆ h 1 . The left factor in the intersection (d3) guarantees that h 1 ∈ e∈S 0 f (e). (For, by this factor and (b2): x o ∈ h o ∩ h 1 and by (b0), (b1) and (b2): e < x 0 for every e ∈ S 0 . Hence ∀e ∈ S 0 : h 0 ≡ e h 1 . By (b1): ∀e ∈ S 0 : h o ≡ e h o and by (b0): h 0 ∈ f (e). So, by transitivity of ≡ e we have ∀e ∈ S o : h 1 ∈ f (e).) As for the middle factor of the intersection above, it guarantees that h 1 ∈ e∈S 1 f (e). Thus, if S = S 0 ∪ S 1 we have completed the proof and h 1 is the desired history, since then h 1 ∈ e∈S f (e). Otherwise, we have to continue by considering another subset S 2 of S.
Successor step. Suppose we have finished the k-th step and accordingly have, for all 0 i k: points e i , x i , x i , histories h i , h i and sets (s0) S i = {e ∈ S/ j<i S j | h i ∈ f (e)∧e < x i } and i . The following holds: The construction guarantees that (s5)
. To see this, take a point x ∈ k . There must be some
, then by the definition of F (see Eq. 2) x SLR e. By (s2) and properties of function s : x i and e are incomparable. On the other hand, if h i ∈ f (e), it cannot be that e < x i , because then e ∈ S i . It cannot be that x i e, either, since this implies e i < e. Thus, e and x i are incomparable. Since s conserves the ordering, by (s2): e and x i are incomparable. By (s2) and (s4): x i , e ∈ h i . Hence,
So, for some x k+1 ∈ W and h k+1 ∈ H ist we have that F (e k+1 ) = h k+1 , x k+1 . Define S k+1 := {e ∈ S/ i k S i | h k+1 ∈ f (e) ∧ e < x k+1 }. From (s5) and NO FINFB 9 we get that for some h k+1 ∈ H ist:
as each of the three sets in this intersection is non-empty. Take x k+1 := s(x k+1 ) ∩ h k+1 and put k+1 = k ∪ {x k+1 }. Of course k+1 ⊆ h k+1 . The left factor in the intersection (s6) guarantees that h k+1 ∈ {f (e) | e ∈ i k S i }. For (to argue indirectly), suppose that (s7) for some e ∈ S j and j k : h k+1 ∈ f (e). By (s1), F (e j ) = h j , x j . By (s2): x j ∈ h j , and by (s6): x j ∈ h k+1 , and by (s0), (s2) and (s4): ∀e ∈ S j : e < x j . Hence ∀e ∈ S j : h j ≡ e h k+1 . By the transitivity of ≡ e and (s3): ∀e ∈ S j : h j ≡ e h k+1 . Since by (s0) ∀e ∈ S j : h j ∈ f (e), we get ∀e ∈ S j : h k+1 ∈ f (e), contradicting (s7).
On the other hand, the middle factor of this intersection guarantees that h k+1 ∈ to the one given in the middle of the successor step,
Yet, to claim that A 1 SLR A 2 , we need to show that for some history h :
To show this, let us put H i := {h ∈ H ist | A i ⊆ h} for i ∈ {1, 2}. For an indirect argument, assume that ∀h ∈ H 1 ∃e * ∈ A 2 : e * / ∈ h, which by the PCP is equivalent to ∀h ∈ H 1 ∃e * ∈ A 2 ∃h ∈ H (e) ∃c ∈ W : (e * ∈ h ∧ h ⊥ c h ∧ c < e * ), from which ∀h ∈ H 1 ∃e * ∈ A 2 ∃c ∈ W : h ⊥ c H (e * ) follows. Since H 2 ⊆ H (e * ) , the latter entails ∀h ∈ H 1 ∃c ∈ W : h ⊥ c H 2 .
Put C := {c ∈ W | ∃h ∈ H 1 h ⊥ c H 2 }. We will argue that C SLR A 1 . First, from the definition of C and H 1 it clearly follows that ∀c ∈ C ∀a ∈ A 1 ∃h ∈ H ist : {c, a} ⊆ h. Second, it is not possible that for a certain c ∈ C and a ∈ A 1 : a < c. Were it so, it would imply that for some e * ∈ A 2 : a < e * (since by the PCP c < e * ), which contradicts (l0). Third, it is not possible that for a certain c ∈ C and a ∈ A 1 : (l1) c < a. By the PCP, for some e ∈ A 2 : (l2) c < e . From the definition of C, for some h 1 , h 2 ∈ H ist : h 1 ⊥ c h 2 , where A 1 ⊆ h 1 and hence a ∈ h 1 and A 2 ⊆ h 2 , hence e ∈ h 2 . This and (l1) and (l2) entail that ¬∃h ∈ H ist : {a, e } ⊆ h, which means that ¬(a SLR A 2 ), contradicting (l0). Therefore C SLR A 1 . We can thus apply NO FINFB to A 1 and C and conclude that (l3) H 1 ∩ { c h 2 | c ∈ C}, where h 2 is some history from H 2 , is non-empty, as both factors in this intersection are non-empty. Take a history h from this intersection. We will argue that A 2 ⊆ h. Suppose to the contrary that for some e ∈ A 2 : e / ∈ h. Then for a history h ∈ H 2 , e ∈ h /h, which yields, by the PCP, ∃c ∈ W h ⊥ c H (e ) , and hence (l4) ∃c ∈ W : h ⊥ c H 2 . Since h belongs to the intersection (l3), by (l4): c ∈ C. Therefore (again since h belongs to (l3)) h ∈ c h 2 , so h ≡ c h 2 , which contradicts (l4), as h 2 ∈ H 2 . Therefore A 1 ∪ A 2 ⊆ h. Thus, we have finally proved that A 1 SLR A 2 .
We thus apply NO FINFB to A 1 and A 2 , and obtain a history The left factor in the intersection (l5) guarantees that h β ∈ {f (e) | e ∈ α<β S α }: the argument is exactly like the one given at the end of the successor step. And the middle factor of this intersection guarantees that h β ∈ e∈S β f (e). Thus, if S = α β S α we have completed the proof and h β is the desired history, since then h β ∈ e∈S f (e). If not, we continue with a point e β+1 from S/ α β S α , making the successor step.
Since we have given instructions on what to do with any point e α whether α is a limit number or not, we are bound to arrive at a desirable history h ∈ {f (e) : e ∈ S}.
The last two theorems in this section are to show that the first two theorems from the above list are not useless: since FINFB leads to INFFB, we need to make sure that neither Condition A nor Condition B yields FINFB.
Theorem 15 If a set S ⊆ W is an infinite consistent set of pairwise SLR points and a function f ∈ e∈S e satisfies this condition:
∃e ∈ S ∀h ∈ H ist ∀x ∈ W : x / ∈ h ∨ ¬(x > e) ∨ h / ∈ f (e) ∨ ∃e 1 ∈ S(h / ∈ f (e 1 ) ∧ ¬(x SLR e 1 ))
then it does not follow that S, f is a case of FINFB.
Proof sketch Our example will take place in an MBS. We will present a proper set in 2 , since the 4 case involves an intuitive extension of our idea which would be formally painful. Assume the second coordinate is spatial. (By '(a, b) ' we will sometimes mean 'a point in 2 'or 'a segment of ', but it will always be clear from the context.)
Let S 1 = {(0, x) ∈ 2 : x ∈ (0, 1)} be a dense segment of splitting points. Suppose all choice points generated by S 1 are binary, and label one possibility '0' and the other '1'. Let each label from name a history belonging to only a finite number of '0'-possibilities. 11 Put B := ( × 2 )/ ≡ S .
The set of choice points generated by S 1 will be called S.
The point that will make Condition A true is [(0,
. This is because it is true that ∀x ∈ W ∀h ∈ H ist :
which we arrived at by transforming Condition A. And the above is true because any point above [(0, 
2 )} ∩ B is infinite, then from our assumption about the histories in our model we infer that {f (e) : e ∈ A} = ∅ (resp. {f (e) : e ∈ A} = ∅), so the antecedent from the definition of NO FINFB is false. In the other case, if
is finite, therefore (again, by our assumption about the histories in the model) {f (e) : e ∈ A ∪ B} = ∅, so the consequent from the definition of NO FINFB is false. Therefore, S, f do not constitute a case of FINFB.
Theorem 16 Suppose Condition A is false, whereas Condition B is true in our model and is the set whose existence is entailed by Condition B. It does not follow that S gives rise to FINFB.
Proof by observation M 2 provides us with an appropriate example (see Sect. 3.1). Set , as defined in Eq. 4, is exactly of the kind required by Condition B. As for Condition A, it is false iff for every infinite S that is pairwise SLR and consistent and for every pointer function on S, there is a function F , as defined in Eq. 2. Clearly, in M 2 there are plenty of infinite sets that are pairwise SLR and consistent. Yet as long as such a set does not contain a choice point, the construction of a function satisfying the conditions on F is straightforward and we leave it to the reader. The only case requiring some attention is if a set described above contains a choice point. Observe that the set of choice points in M 2 is S = { 1, n : n ∈ N}. Thus, we need to say what value F takes 11 The fear that a history belonging to an infinite number of elementary possibilities would nevertheless be reinserted by the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma should be alleviated, as Condition A is assumed to be true. on elements of S 12 :
where i = 0, 1 and g is some function from F such that g(n) = i. It is easy to see that this function satisfies conditions on F from Eq. 2. Thus, since for every infinite S that is pairwise SLR and consistent and for every pointer function on S, there is a sought-for function F , Condition A is false in M 2 . Finally, as shown by Müller et al. (2006) , there is no finitary funny business in M 2 .
The upshot of this section is this: given the existence of space-time points, there are exactly two ways of producing INFFB, where there is no case of FINFB: by Condition A and by Condition B. In the next section, we will investigate if these conditions can be true in an MBS.
Funny business in MBS models
This section concerns Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS's), which we introduced in our paper (2007) Each element of the base set W of an MBS is a certain equivalence class [x σ ], where x ∈ 4 and σ belongs to the set of history labels. The ordering is defined as below:
We need now to relate subsets of W to subsets of 4 , which is done by the following definition:
Definition 17 Let S ⊆ W . We will say that S M = {z ∈ 4 | ∃σ ∈ : [z σ ] ∈ S} is the reduced set derived from S.
In other words, the reduced set of a subset S of W is what we get after projecting S on 4 ; it is the set of spatiotemporal locations occupied by members of S.
Since one way of introducing INFFB is via Condition A, let us investigate what this condition amounts to in an MBS. It will turn out that we can introduce a certain kind of funny business ('epsilon funny business', labeled FB), present whenever Condition A is true. This will give us some details about the situations in which funny business can arise in MBS's. We need to show that for every triple γ, x, α (γ, α ∈ , x ∈ 4 ) the following formula is true:
Definition 18
The formula is a disjunction D 1 ∨D 2 ∨D 3 ∨D 4 ∨D 5 . For a triple γ, x, α we consider now two cases. It may be that for this triple
is true, and hence, obviously, the entire disjunction (8) is true as well. In the other case, D 1 ∨D 2 ∨D 3 ∨D 4 is not true for the triple, i.e., the conjunction ¬D 1 ∧ ¬D 2 ∧ ¬D 3 ∧ ¬D 4 obtains. For Condition A to be true, in this case the triple must make D 5 true, i.e.,
We will now show this. Since by ¬D 3 : x > e * , we may define a nonempty subset B(x) of S M , whose elements are in the backward light cone of x, i.e., B(x) := {z ∈ S M |z < M x}. Observe now that for all e from S M : (a) e ∈ B(x) iff ¬(e SLR M x). The implication to the right is obvious; to see that the reverse implication holds as well, note that it holds if e < x. And e > x is impossible, since it implies (as x > e * ) that for some e ∈ S M e > e, which contradicts that S M is pairwise SLR. Now by (a), Formula 9 is equivalent to:
which is equivalent to:
and further equivalent to:
From the construction of B(x) and FB : 
pointer function f such that S and f constitute FB.
Note the consequences of this fact. In order that Condition A be true in an MBS, there must be in the reduced set S M such an e * that e∈ (e * ρ) f ([e σ ]) = ∅, no matter how small the diameter ρ is. The intersection cannot be empty if it is possible to have an (e * ρ) to which only e * belongs. Also, on the supposition that NO FINFB is true, the intersection cannot be empty if some (e * ρ) contain only a finite subset of S M . Hence, in an MBS Condition A can be true provided that S M contains a convergent sequence, together with its point of convergence.
We will finally check whether Condition B can be true in MBS's. To begin our exploration, let us ask what form a consistent pairwise SLR set S should take to give rise to funny business, INFFB or FINFB, in an MBS. Assume thus that S is a subset of W , all elements of which have the form [e σ ] for a given σ ∈ . Clearly, S is a subset of a history. Consider a pointer function f on S, and assume that S, f is a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB. Thus,
Now pick some a * = a * 0 , a * 1 , a * 2 , a * 3 ∈ S M and consider elements of 4 located 'vertically' above a * , i.e., the set L := {x | x = x 0 , a * 1 , a * 2 , a * 3 ∧ x 0 a * 0 }. Our guiding idea is this: we want to see what has to happen if S, f is to be a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB. Usually there exist 'safe' subsets of S such that there is a history passing through all the elementary possibilities designated by the function f at the points from the subsets. Suppose that it is not the case regarding the whole set S (meaning that we have an example of funny business). What, then, with the 'in-between' section -the sets larger then the obviously 'safe' ones and smaller than the whole S? Does there have to be a biggest 'safe' set, or the smallest 'unsafe' set? Let us put these ideas down formally. For x ∈ L, we will say that x is good iff for
If x is not good, we will say it is bad.
Clearly, a * is good, and if x, y ∈ L, x < M y, and y is good, then x is good as well. Hence there are initial non-empty segments of L, all of whose elements are good. We call such initial segments 'good'. The question now is: what maximal good initial segments of L are possible? (Since the sum of a set of good segments is a good segment, for any chain a maximal good initial segment will exist-apply the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma to the set of all good initial segments ordered by inclusion.) There are two possibilities:
(1) The maximal good initial segment of L is not upper bounded, and hence is identical to L.
Hence every x ∈ L is good. Let us thus pick a countable 'sampling sequence' G = x o , x 1 , x 2 , . . . that grows by a constant step upward, i.e, ∀i, j ∈ N : | x i+1 − x i | =| x j +1 − x j |. An advantage of a steadily growing sequence is that it goes ad infinitum vertically. As every x ρ ∈ G is good, we associate with each x ρ a history label σ ρ and a set S ρ such that (t0)
S ρ . (To avoid double subscripts, we sometimes write a history label alongside a point from 4 .) On the basis of the sequence G we will now produce a chain of elements in our MBS, which we will next use to generate a history, via the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma. To begin with, since x 0 is good, by (t0) we have:
{f ( 
is non-empty. Let thus take a history from this intersection and label it σ 1 . By the lhs term,
The rhs term means that S is a subset of history σ 1 .
Suppose that we reached step ρ, having a chain
is non-empty. Let thus take a history from this intersection and label it σ ρ+1 . By the lhs term,
By the middle term: [x ρ+1 σ ρ+1 ] > k ρ+1 S k . The rhs term means that S is a subset of history σ ρ+1 .
We thus produce in our MBS an infinite chain [
. .. By the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma, we next introduce a history, call it σ * , that contains our chain. We claim now that σ * ∈ [e σ ]∈S f ([e σ ]), which means that S, f does not constitute INFFB. For reductio, let for some
). Yet, since G extends upwards ad infinitum, for some x α ∈ G : c * < M x α . Since by the rhs terms of the above intersections
Since σ * labels the history that contains our chain, it must be that
. This means that σ * and σ α are undivided at [c * σ ], so contrary to (t4), σ * ∈ f ([c * σ ]). We thus proved that if a maximal chain of good elements of L is not bounded in L, then S, f does not constitute INFFB.
(2) The maximal good initial segment of L is upper bounded, so by properties of 4 and our construction, it has a supremum; dub it x * . Is then x * good or bad? Again, there are two options: (2a) x * is bad. We already know that for any x ∈ L such that x < x * , x is good. Hence, funny business is located, so to speak, on the backward light cone of x * , i.e., on
In other words, defining S = {[e σ ] ∈ S | e ∈ B |x * }, we have it that S , f is a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB. (2b) x * is good. This means that for any x ∈ L such that x > x * , x is bad. Hence, on any outer lining (however thin)
, of the backward light cone of x * , there is located a case of funny business. More precisely, defining S(δ) = {[e σ ] ∈ S | e ∈ B x * (δ)}, we have it that for any δ, S(δ), f is a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB.
Thus, the result of this exploration is that if a consistent pairwise SLR set S gives rise to funny business in an MBS, then there is an x * ∈ 4 such that one of the following two conditions obtains:
(1) on the backward light cone of x * there is a reduced set S M of S such that S ⊆ S and S gives rise to funny business, or (2) on any outer lining of the backward light cone of x * there is a reduced set S M (δ) ∈ 4 of S(δ) such that S(δ) ⊆ S and S(δ) gives rise to funny business.
To put it more precisely,
Fact 22
If a consistent pairwise SLR set S gives rise to funny business (FINFB or INFFB) in an MBS, then there is an x * ∈ 4 such that either (1) there is a set S ⊆ S giving rise to funny business, whose reduced set S M is a subset of
is a family of sets S(δ) ⊆ S, δ > 0, each S(δ) giving rise to funny business, and such that the reduced set S M (δ) of S(δ) is a subset of
B x * (δ) = {x ∈ 4 | x < M x * (δ) ∧ x M x * }, where x * (δ) = x * 0 + δ, x * 1 , x * 2 , x * 3 .
Note that S can be different from S as well as from any S(δ).
Let us observe the first consequence of this exploration: in MBS-like models based on 2 , a consistent pairwise SLR set cannot give rise to INFFB if ¬ Condition A and NO FINFB are true. 13 To see this, observe first that in the two-dimensional case, the backward light cone B |x * is reduced to two straight lines, call them 'left' and 'right'. Since S = {[e σ ] | e ∈ S M } (σ ∈ ) is assumed to be pairwise SLR, S M could have at most two elements located on B |x * (one on the left line, the other on the right line). Thus, in the two-dimensional case, if NO FINFB is true, there can be no INFFB located on the backward light cone of x. Let us next ask if there can be INFFB located on the outer linings B x * (δ)? Consider the outer linings of one line, say the left one. Such outer linings can be written as
In a similar vein, no e ∈ S M such that e > M a * can belong to B L (δ), where a * is that element of S M from which we started the construction of the chain L containing x * . Thus, B L (δ) cannot go infinitely down along the left line, or up to x. Hence, given that NO FINFB is true, in order that every B L (δ) (i.e., for any δ > 0) generate INFFB, there must be a sequence of elements of S M converging to a point from the left line. Moreover, since elements of S M are SLR M , there must be exactly one point of convergence located on the left line. The same is true about the right outer linings, B R (δ). That is, for INFFB to obtain, a sequence in S M must converge to a point e L located on the left line or a sequence in S M must converge to a point e R located on the right line. Accordingly, we should consider three cases: (1) in S M there is only a sequence converging to a point e L on the left line, (2) in S M there is only a sequence converging to a point e R on the right line, and (3) in S M there are two sequences, one converging to a certain e L on the left line and the other converging to a certain e R on the right line. In each case we need to construct an outer lining B x * (δ * ) that does not generate INFFB. We will produce the required construction for case (3) only, as it is more complicated, and the reader will surely know how to transform it into arguments appropriate for the remaining two cases. Assume then case (3) One might hope that this result, i.e., in a two-dimensional MBS-like model, a consistent pairwise SLR set S cannot give rise to INFFB if NO FINFB and ¬ Condition A are true, carries over to the real, i.e, four-dimensional MBS. This hope is however shattered by a construction which in essence consists in wrapping the M 2 structure around a backward light cone of some x * -see Fig. 3 . Consider an MBS whose set of history labels is the set of all functions g : N → {0, 1} such that for only finitely many n ∈ N, g(n) = 0. The construction from Sect. 3 of our paper (2007) guarantees that this is indeed an MBS, provided that a certain topological condition is true, which we will check in due course. Consider ( †) x * = 0, 0, 0, 0 ∈ 4 , its backward light cone B |x * , and a sequence of 'angles' ϕ n = π(2 n − 1)/2 n (n = 1, 2, . . .). Let S M = { −n, n cos(ϕ n ), n sin(ϕ n ), 0 | n = 1, 2, . . .}. The (Euclidean) distance between any two elements of S M is at least √ 2. Also, S M is pairwise SLR M and S M ⊆ B |x * . Each e n ∈ S M belongs to appropriate sets of splitting points, according to this rule:
We can assign the same history label to all elements of S M , for instance g * , such that for all n, g * (n) = 1. Consider a pointer function
(Compare our discussion of elementary possibilities in M 2 (Sect. 3.1).) Since among history labels there is no function g that yields infinitely many zeros, S, f is a case of INFFB. On the other hand, S does not give rise to FINFB, since there are history labels yielding arbitrarily large finite number of zeros. Also, since there is a minimal distance √ 2 between elements of S M , one can associate with every e n ∈ S M a neighborhood (e n √ 2/2) = {e ∈ S M |d(e, e n ) < √ 2/2} to which only the singleton {e n } belongs. The existence of such deltas means that NO FB is true in our model, and hence, by Fact 21, ¬ Condition A is true as well. This means that Condition B must be true in the model. 14 Let us now turn to the above-mentioned topological condition, which is of high importance: it has to be true in order for histories in the model to be isomorphic to Minkowski space-time, which is an intended feature of MBS's. We first need a small definition:
Definition 23 For a given maximal upward-directed set h and a point x ∈ 4 ,
Consider now a given maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B. With every lower bounded chain L ⊂ 4 we would like to associate a topology (called a 'chain topology') on the set of h (inf(L)). We define the topology by describing the whole family of closed sets, which is equal to
(Since L is a chain, it is evident that the family is closed with respect to intersection and finite union). The condition runs as follows:
Condition 24
For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every lower bounded chain L ⊂ 4 the 'chain topology' described above is compact.
Since in such a topology { h (l)|l ∈ L} is a centred family of closed sets (every finite subset of it has a nonempty intersection), the above condition is equivalent to the following:
Condition 25 For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every chain
The only chains in 4 that might falsify this (and thus the former) condition are those that contain x * , see ( †). As an example, consider the vertical chain L of elements below x * , including x * . Since histories are labeled by elements of the set , we might write, for z ∈ L, g (z) := {g ∈ | [z g ] = [z g ]}, as in Definition 23.
We have now, for every y = x * ∈ L : g (y) = , whereas g (x * ) = {g}. However odd it might seem, this means that our topological condition is satisfied, and hence that the model described is indeed an MBS. The oddity is similar to a feature of M 2 : no matter which history label is associated with x * , the resulting event in BST is the least upper bound of some elements of S and it cannot be SLR to any remaining element of S. The second trick of our MBS is that elements of S M escape steadily to the past, which ensures that there is always a finite distance between them. A natural question is whether S M bounded on temporal coordinates can yield INFFB if NO FINFB and ¬ Condition A are true; we leave it as an open problem.
To sum up our investigations of MBS's, we have the following:
(1) If in an MBS there is funny business (FINFB or INFFB) produced by a consistent pairwise SLR set S, then there is some x ∈ 4 such that either (a) there is a set S ⊆ S, which gives rise to funny business and whose reduced set S M is located on the backward light cone of x, or (b) any outer lining of the backward light cone of x includes the reduced set of a set S(δ) ⊆ S that generates funny business. (2) In order for Condition A to be true, given that NO FINFB obtains, there must be a set of choice points whose reduced set contains a converging sequence together with its point of convergence. (3) Condition B cannot be true in two-dimensional MBS-like models if ¬ Condition A and NO FINFB are true. However, there are four-dimensional MBS models in which Condition B is true, even although ¬ Condition A and NO FINFB are true.
It is an open question whether for such cases to arise one needs a set S M which is not bounded on the temporal coordinate.
Conclusion and open problems
We have shown some results concerning finitary and infinitary funny business. There are exactly two ways of generating INFFB which does not involve FINFB: via Condition A or via Condition B. On the other hand, the falsity of both conditions in a model with space-time points and NO FINFB entails that there is NO INFFB in this model. In the second part of the paper we explored under what conditions there could be funny business in MBS's. We first observed that in an MBS a set S responsible for funny business must be quite particularly located; namely if there is funny business produced by a consistent pairwise SLR set S, then there is some x ∈ 4 such that either (1) there is a set S ⊆ S, which gives rise to funny business and whose reduced set S M is located on the backward light cone of x, or (2) any outer lining of the backward light cone of x includes the reduced set of a set S(δ) ⊆ S which generates funny business. Our next finding is that Condition A can be true in an MBS (and generate INFFB) only provided that there is a convergent sequence in the reduced set S M of a set S which gives rise to INFFB. Finally, we have shown an MBS model in which Condition B is true, yet Condition A and FINFB do not hold; the set of which Condition B speaks is not bounded on the time coordinate. We conjecture that for Condition B to be true in an MBS, 'its' set must have that feature. Another open problem concerns the question whether INFFB (without FINFB) can be yielded by a set that is either inconsistent or has an upper unbounded chain. Almost all our theorems concern INFFB yielded by a consistent pairwise SLR set, the sole exception being the theorem that NO FINFB + Condition B entails INFFB. It seems that INFFB to which this theorem refers can be produced by a consistent set containing a vertically infinite chain. To rule out this possibility, we assumed another condition, called Supplement. Yet, a challenge remains: one would like to see examples of INFFB (without FINFB) that were produced by inconsistent sets, or by sets with vertical chains, and then find conditions under which they occur.
The moral of our findings is that, spatio-temporally speaking, INFFB without FINFB is possible; however, since this phenomenon requires either convergent (in 4 ) sequences of choice points, or choice points escaping to infinity on the time coordinate, INFFB without FINFB is not physically viable.
The proof is obvious. Proof From the definition of finitary funny business, we have A and B such that A SLR B and {f (e) : e ∈ A} = ∅, {f (e) : e ∈ B} = ∅. For h A take then any history from the first intersection, and for h B -any history from the other. Hence A ⊂ h A and B ⊂ h B . From {f (e) : e ∈ A ∪ B} = ∅ it follows that A h A ∩ B h B = ∅.
Lemma 27
Turning next to combinatorial funny business, Müller et al. (2006) define it in terms of a set T of elementary transitions, where an elementary transition is a pair: point event e i , elementary possibility H i at e i . Thus, a given S, f uniquely specifies a set of of transitions, and a set of transitions uniquely determines a pair S, f . To ease the exposition, in the lemmas below we will refer to S, f as a set of transitions, and we will claim that under certain condition, S, f is a case of infinitary funny business iff S, f is a case of combinatorial funny business. Müller et al. (2006) say that set T of elementary transitions is combinatorially consistent iff for any two transitions t i , t j ∈ T , (1) if e i = e j , then H i = H j , (2) if e i < e j , then H (e j ) ⊆ H i , (3) if e j < e i , then H (e i ) ⊆ H j , and (4) if e i and e j are incomparable, then e i SLR e j .
Finally, they say that T is consistent iff ∅ = H T := {H i | t i ∈ T } and that T constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business iff T is combinatorially consistent but inconsistent.
We finally turn to our lemmas:
f (e ) ⊆ f (e)) of infinitary funny business. And, if card(S) < ω, by condition (4) of combinatorial consistency and the assumption that S, f is not a case of finitary funny business, we get that S, f is consistent, i.e., not a case of combinatorial funny business. Thus, card(S) ω.
Location of choice points
Consider the Prior Choice Principle. It says that if (0) x ∈ h/ h , then there is an e such that (1) e < x and (2) h ⊥ e h. (0)-(2) then entail that ∀h x ∈ h → h ⊥ e h, which can be written as h ⊥ e H (x) . Thus, defining C h (x) := {e ∈ W | h ⊥ e H (x) }, we already know that if C h (x) is non-empty, then by (1) at least one of its elements is below x. Where are other elements of C h (x) located? Our claim now is that if (3) C h (x) ∪ {x} does not give rise to FINFB, then C h (x) < x. For reductio, suppose that h ⊥ e H (x) and e SLR x. By the assumption (3), there is an h ∈ e h ∩ H (x), and hence h ≡ e h and h ∈ H (x) , which contradicts h ⊥ e H (x) . For future reference, we will slightly generalize these observations and put it as a fact: It is worth noting that this fact is a special case of one of the equivalences of the four various notions of modal funny business that Belnap (2002) and Belnap (2003) established. It is a special case of the implication from the so-called some-cause-likelocus-not-in-past funny business to generalized primary SLR modal-correlation funny business.
MBS models
The core idea of Müller (2002) is to paste together copies of Minkowski space-time in a particular way. The copies are labeled by elements of a certain set, called the set of history labels. This terminology is justified at the end of the construction, as it turns out that the resulting structure is a BST model and there is a one-to-one correspondence between "its" set of histories and the set of history labels. The pasting is achieved by taking the quotient structure of the set of pairs: x ∈ 4 , a history label by a certain equivalence relation.
Here are the basic blocks of the construction:
-the set of history labels (no restrictions on cardinality). C σ η ⊂ 4 -the set of splitting points between histories labeled by σ and η (no cardinality requirements). R σ η = {x ∈ 4 |¬∃y ∈ C σ η y < M x}-the region of overlap between histories labeled by σ and η.
It is required that for any σ, η, γ ∈ 1. all members of C σ η are space-like related, 2. C σ η = C ησ , 3. σ = η ⇒ C σ η = ∅, and 4. ∀x ∈ C σ γ ∃y ∈ C σ η ∪ C ηγ y M x.
The assumptions are motivated by axioms of BST. On × 4 one defines next the relation ≡ S : x σ ≡ S y η iff x = y and x ∈ R σ η . This can be shown to be an equivalence relation; it is used for "gluing together" points in regions of overlap.
A BST base set is: Thus, every history in a given MBS is isomorphic to Minkowski space-time. By an MBS we mean a structure defined as above, in which the topological condition 24 is true.
